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Attorney Fees in Repeated Relationships
Abstract
We investigate contracts between a law firm and a corporate client involved in a repeated relation-
ship. In contrast to the previous literature pertaining to one-time interactions between clients and
attorneys, we find that the contingent fee is not the best arrangement. Rather, the contingent fee
is dominated by a contract which, we argue, an outside observer could not distinguish from simple
hourly fee contract. This contract includes an hourly fee equal to the law firm’s opportunity cost,
a lump sum, and a retention function. The lump sum payment is independent of the number of
hours worked by the law firm and the outcome of the case. The repeated nature of the relationship
allows the client to create a contract where the desire to maintain the relationship induces the law
firm to exert the optimal level of effort in the current case.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: K40, K41, L14.
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1 Introduction
Contingent fee agreements are widely used in personal injury and medical malpractice litigation.
These cases tend to involve clients with little experience in litigation who hire attorneys on a one-
time basis. Numerous authors have considered this situation and find the contingent fee superior
to other fee arrangements.1 The typical reasoning in favor of the contingent fee stems from the
familiar moral hazard problem. That is, if attorney effort is not observable, then an hourly or fixed
fee arrangement does not induce the attorney to exert the effort necessary to maximize the client’s
expected award. The contingent fee, by giving the attorney a stake in the final award, induces the
attorney to put forth a greater effort (Danzon, 1983). Contingent fees are found to be preferable
to hourly or fixed fees in a number of other settings as well.2
However, the relationship between corporate clients and law firms has received little attention.
Hadfield (2000) and Kritzer, et al. (1985) note that corporate clients and law firms typically engage
in fixed or hourly fee, rather than contingent fee, contracts. One reason may be that corporate
clients are better informed about the merits of their cases than the average plaintiff (Dana and Spier,
1993). Another possible explanation is that corporate plaintiffs are involved in more litigation than
the average plaintiff and frequently use the same law firms for multiple cases (Coates, et al., 2011).
This repeated interaction allows the law firm to establish a reputation with the corporate client that
sends a clearer signal of the law firm’s quality. In addition, the repeated nature of the arrangement
allows the client to punish the law firm for poor performance by reducing the number of cases it
sends to the law firm or by terminating the relationship. A law firm, therefore, must consider the
impact of its level of effort for any single case on the continuing relationship with the client.
We show that in repeated relationships between law firms and corporate clients the contingent
fee is no longer the optimal compensation arrangement. Rather, a contract combining an hourly
fee, a lump sum payment, and a retention function can improve the client’s payoff and lead to an
efficient outcome.3 The lump sum payment in our contract is independent of the outcome of the
1However, Schwartz and Mitchell (1970) find the hourly fee to be more desirable than the contingent fee.
2Contingent fees have been deemed desirable when clients are risk averse (Danzon, 1983), the attorney has better
information regarding the merits of the case than the client (Dana and Spier, 1993), risk sharing is appropriate
(Posner, 1986), information is asymmetric (Rubinfeld and Scotchmer, 1993), and clients cannot afford hourly or fixed
fees (Rhein, 1982).
3We restrict our attention to legally permissible means of payments which include contingent fees, hourly wages
and lump sum payments. See Santore and Viard (2001) for a discussion of restrictions on legal service payments.
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case and the law firm’s performance. In contrast, the retention function states the probability that
the client will continue his relationship with the law firm as a function of the outcome of the current
case.
We treat both the lump sum payment and the retention function as explicit elements of the
contract. However, there seems to be no loss in treating the retention function as an implicit
contractual element. This is made more feasible by the fact that the retention function takes a very
simple and intuitive form. In particular, it is piece-wise linear and (weakly) increasing in realized
payoffs. Regarding the lump sum payment, we argue in Section 5 that it may easily arise from an
acknowledged distortion in reported hours. Hence, to an outside observer, the contract we suggest
is indistinguishable from the hourly contracts observed in practice by Hadfield (2000) and Kritzer,
et al. (1985).
The combination of the three contractual elements creates the incentives for the law firm to
provide the efficient effort level. The hourly fee is set at exactly the opportunity cost of the law
firm’s time, and the lump sum payment is unaffected by the law firm’s actions. Thus, the incentive
for the law firm to exert optimal effort is not based on compensation derived from the current case
but solely on the likelihood of receiving lump sum payments in future cases. Because the likelihood
of receiving future cases is determined by the realized payoff in the current case, the firm acts to
satisfy the client in the current case. In contrast to one-time contingent fee contracts, the repeated
nature of the relationship allows the client to design a contract such that the law firm cares about
the full realized payoff in the current case rather than the fraction of the payoff it receives.
The previous literature regarding attorney fees has largely found that contingent fee arrange-
ments provide better incentives than hourly or fixed fee agreements. However, the contingent fee
does not create perfect incentives for the attorney in these models.4 Our contract provides the law
firm with the incentives to choose the efficient effort level. Under mild assumptions, this leads to an
outcome that the client prefers to the outcome from a one shot contract. However, our contract is
likely not ’second best.’ We do not set out to find such a contract, but rather to find a justification
for the simple wage contracts which we observe in the market for corporate legal services.
4Only a 100% contingent fee completely solves the moral hazard problem in the models in the literature, but this
arrangement is not legally permissible. See Danzon (1983), Halpern and Turnbull (1983), Hay (1996) and Santore
and Viard (2001).
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An important assumption of our model is that the client may terminate his relationship with
the attorney at any time. This assumption allows us to simplify the analysis by limiting the client’s
decision to a choice between continuing or terminating its relationship with the law firm. Evidence
suggests that corporate clients are able to reduce the intensity of a relationship with one law firm
at nearly zero cost from the common use of “preferred counsel” lists that are maintained by many
Fortune 500 companies.5 Preferred counsel lists are created by corporations to inform managers
about which law firms are approved for use in a particular type of case. Law firms are informed of
their placement on or removal from the list and most companies list multiple law firms for each type
of legal dispute (Jones, 2003). Thus, if a corporate client wishes to punish a law firm for providing
insufficient effort it can simply give a larger share of its cases to one of the other approved firms.
Additionally, the corporation can remove the law firm from the preferred counsel list altogether.
In a recent survey of Fortune 500 corporations, Coates et al. (2011) find the most common reason
for reducing the volume of cases general counsel allocated to a particular law firm was poor quality
service. Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates corporate general counsel consider only very
recent activity by the law firm when setting compensation and the likelihood of retention (Jones
2003).
We are not aware of other studies that provide a formal analysis of repeated legal services
contracts. A few authors have considered information asymmetries related to the performance of
law firms. For example, Smith and Cox (1985) find empirical evidence that firms invest in their
reputations to signal to clients that they are high quality. Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar (2008) also
examine contracts between clients and law firms, but in a one-shot setting. In their model, an
attorney must balance the interests of the client and the law firm for which he works. They argue
that the hourly fee is preferred to the contingent fee because it offers a solution to this dual agency
problem. (See also Gilson and Mnookin (1985) and McChesney (1982) on agency problems within
law firms.) Mixed fee arrangements have also been considered by others. For example Clermont and
Currivan (1978) propose a mixture of hourly and contingent fees to solve the moral hazard problem.
Likewise, Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993) find that a combination of fixed and contingent fees is
optimal when information is asymmetric. These authors focus on one time interactions whereas we
5The assumption of a zero replacement cost is common in the literature on repeated contracting with moral hazard
discussed below. See, e.g., Spear and Wang (1995) and Banks and Sundaram (1998).
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consider repeated interactions between the attorney and client.
There are two closely related strands of literature outside of law and economics: the literature
on implicit contracts, and the literature on repeated contracting under moral hazard. Our paper
is distinguished from both literatures by our focus on the corporate legal services market. In
particular, we take institutional constraints on legal service compensation very seriously. Our
analysis is not directed towards finding a standard ’second best’ contract. We do not claim to have
found such a contract. Instead, we find an efficient contract that a client would chose if: he is
involved in a repeated relationship, and must choose a contract that appears outwardly to be a
standard legal services contract. Other distinctions arise as we discuss these literatures in the next
two paragraphs.
The contract that we propose takes advantage of repetition within the relationship to im-
prove incentives through the retention function. The literature on implicit contracts is similar (see
MacLeod (2007) for a useful survey). In particular, Klein and Leﬄer (1981) show agents can be
induced to supply high quality output when they receive a flow of rents and face the threat of
losing those rents if they provide low quality output. Our model is also similar to the efficiency
wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and the more general relational contracting models of
MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and Levin (2003). These papers, along with others such as Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy (1994), allow for a variety of contract forms including bonus payments. This
bonus depends upon non-contractable signals concerning the non-stochastic portion of the firm’s
performance. Our model contains no such bonus.
Our paper is also related to the very large literature on repeated contracting with moral hazard.
Many of the papers in this literature consider long term contracts with commitment. Some papers
of this sort which include the threat of termination include: Banks and Sundaram (1998), Heinkel
and Stoughton (1994), Spear and Wang (2005), and Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012). These papers
take advantage of the commitment between principal and agent to allow transfers in the current
period to depend upon previous periods. Such dependence allows the agent to smooth consumption,
and also allows the principal to provide stronger incentives even when the agent is risk neutral.
However, such explicitly multi-period contracts don’t seem empirically valid in the market for legal
services. By ruling out long term contracts, Olcay (2012) comes closer in spirit to our model.
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However, Olcay (2012) still has many features which make it unsuitable for the current study. In
particular, the agent makes a binary choice (high or low effort) in each period, and this choice
determines the probability of a binary (good or bad) outcome. Finally, all the models discussed in
this paragraph use contracts in which rewards depend only upon outcomes. Unlike our paper, they
rule out the hourly wage contracts which seem ubiquitous for corporate clients.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3, we present a fairly
standard model of short term legal service contracts. The contract from this Section serves as a
baseline for our long term contract. In Section 4, we describe our proposed contract, and present
our main results. Section 5 contains a discussion of the results and concludes the paper. Proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model Set Up
We consider a single corporate client and an infinite number of identical law firms interacting in
a perfectly competitive legal services market. In each period t = 1, 2, ... the client is involved in a
case requiring legal services. Whichever law firm is employed in period t is simply referred to as the
law firm. The client and law firm are both risk neutral. We assume that the client is the plaintiff
to ease comparisons with the existing literature on contingent fee contracts.6
The period t case has characteristics (it, λt, ρt). Standard features of the case, like the produc-
tivity of legal services, are determined by it ∈ I. The set I is finite, and it = i with time invariant
probability qi. The parameters λt and ρt relate to the law firm’s ability to defraud the client on the
current case. In particular, λt determines the maximal amount by which the law firm can defraud
the client, and ρt determines the degree to which defrauding the client biases ht away from the
efficient choice. We discuss λt and ρt more fully in the next Section when they are used.
We find two contracts. We find a benchmark short term contract. Discussion of the short
term contract’s specific features is deferred to later. The long term contract is designed to take
advantage of the repeated interactions between client and law firm. Both contracts are designed
to respect both observed institutional realities of legal service contracting and our assumption of a
competitive market. To this end, we assume that the long term contract is decided at time t = 0
6Our contract is independent of the status of the client. See Section 5 for further discussion.
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by a take it or leave it offer from client to all law firms. Any firm which accepts is placed within
the long term contract queue. The first three features of the offered contract are the wage rate w,
the contingent fee percentage α, and the lump sum payment L. These payment elements cannot
be altered in period t and are independent of both the characteristics of the case and the law firm’s
performance in earlier cases. This modeling choice reflects the observation that wage rates and
contingent fees are set by law firms in response to market pressures. Consequently, the client can’t
change these payments on a period by period basis as would be predicted by the literature on
repeated contracting with moral hazard. We rule out L < 0 with a limited liability assumption.7
The final feature of the contract does depend upon the characteristics of the case at hand. This
last feature is the Probability of Retention Function P (·) which determines the probability that
the current firm will be retained into the following period. The function P (·) depends upon both
the case characteristics, and the firm’s performance in the current case. In principle, P (·) could
depend upon the past performance of the law firm. However, our construction depends only upon
the current case. The client is always indifferent between retaining or replacing the current law
firm.
To summarize, the client’s take it of leave it offer at time t = 0 is (w,α,L, P (·)). This contract
guides all future long term interactions between the client and a firm. Each firm which accepts this
offer, enters the long term contract queue. If the client wishes the period t case to be governed by
the long term contract, then the first firm in the long term contract queue is given the opportunity
to work on the period t case. In period t = 0, the client also forms a short term contract queue.
This second queue includes all law firms.
Each period t > 0 proceeds as depicted in Figure 1. Subscript ts are suppressed in Figure
1. At the beginning of each period, the client learns case characteristics it ∈ I. If, given case
characteristics it, the client prefers the long term contract, then he contacts the firm at the front
of the long term contract queue. Upon being contacted, the firm becomes aware of information it
and decides whether to accept or decline the case. If the case is declined, both the client and law
firm receive a period t payoff of zero, and the long term contract queue remains unchanged.8 If the
7Setting L < 0 is in any case illegal. See, e.g., Santore and Viard (2001).
8In practice, the client might turn to another law firm if the law firm rejected the long term contract for this
particular case. We don’t include any such ability because in equilibrium no case is ever rejected.
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contract is accepted, the lump sum L is paid to the law firm, and the period t case begins. Once
the case begins, the law firm becomes aware of its ability to defraud the client as captured by λt
and ρt. The law firm then chooses: ht, the hours worked on the case, and rt, the hours reported to
the client. The reported hours, rt, are observable and contractable, while the actual hour worked,
ht, are neither. On the other hand, ht stochastically determines the client’s award.
Law firm
retained or
released
h and r
chosen
θ
realized
α A+wr
Paid
i
realized
Law firm
offered
case
L paid
λ and ρ
realized
Figure 1: Timeline
Let θt denote the random elements of the case outside the law firm’s control. The variable θt
is i.i.d. and uniformly distributed on [−12 ,
1
2 ]. The damage award from the case is A(it, ht, θt) =
Aˆ(it, ht) + B(it, ht) · ξ(it, θt).
9 We assume that B(it, ht) > 0, ξθt ≥ 0 and that Eθt [ξ(it, θt)] = 0.
Hence Aˆ(it, ht) = Eθt [A(it, ht, θt)]. The convention that a hatted variable is the expected value of
the variable prior to the case, but after it has been realized, is followed throughout. We assume
the expected award increases in hours at a decreasing rate: Aˆh > 0, and Aˆhh < 0.
We denote by h∗i the (unique) efficient number of hours given information i, as defined by
Aˆh(i, h
∗
i ) = c. For clarity in exposition, we define r
∗
i = h
∗
i .
10 We use starred variables to denote
the value of that variable when it = i and rt = ht = h
∗
i . For example, Aˆ
∗(i) = Aˆ(i, h∗i ). Throughout
a subscript θ or h denotes a partial derivative. However, a subscript i denotes that it = i, and a
subscript t indicates we are referring to a variable in period t.
After ht and rt are set, θt is realized and A(it, ht, θt) is determined. The client then makes a
payment of α ·A(it, ht, θt) + w · rt to the law firm. Let c denote the law firm’s marginal cost. Law
firm profits from the current case are αA(it, ht, θt) + w · rt − c · ht + L, while the client’s surplus
from the case is (1 − α)A(it, ht, θt) − w · rt − L. In the final step of the period, the client retains
the law firm with probability P (·). If the firm is retained, then it remains at the front of the long
9The C.D.F. of ξi, Fi(·), is defined by Fi(ξi(θ)) = 1/2 + θ. Hence, the realized reward are a function of the CDF
of the random element ξi. This may be an unusual approach, but it allows a more uniform presentation.
10We look for a contract in which the total wage payment is w · rt. Hence, we want our contract to illicit truthful
reporting. There are many other possible contracts. In particular, as long as the relationship between rt and ht is
one to one, it is possible to set the wage payment to w · ht based upon the reported rt.
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term contract queue. If the law firm is not retained, then it is removed from the long term contract
queue, and the remaining firms all move up in the queue.
If the client chooses the short term contract, then things proceed in much the same manner.
Again, the period begins with the client’s observation of the case type it. The client then approaches
the first firm in the short term contract queue and makes a take it or leave it offer (wt, αt, Lt).
11
There is no Probability of Retention Function because the law firm in a short term contract is
never retained. The law firm observes it, and then accepts or rejects the offer. If she rejects, then
both law firm and client receive zero that period. If she accepts then things proceed as they did in
the long term contract case, except that elements of the short term contract are used to determine
payoffs. At the end of the case, the law firm is always removed from the queue, and the remaining
law firms move up in the queue.
We are modeling a repeated game. Strategies may depend upon the entire history up to the
current period. However, we severely restrict the set of strategies under consideration. To begin,
in period t = 0 the client is committing to a particular behavior in all later periods. Furthermore,
we design a probability of retention function which depends only upon the outcome in the current
period. Given the contract offered by the client, the law firm has no reason to play a strategy
that depends upon more than the characteristics of the current case. Hence, we do not model all
of the features of repeated game strategies. We might think of the law firm as playing a Markov
strategy for which the state specifies the characteristics of the case and who is at the front of the
queue. That is, the law firm has a strategy which tells it what to do in a period t based purely
upon (it, λt, ρt). For this reason, we suppress the time subscript t on h, r, and θ when discussing
the long term contract.
3 One Shot Contract
In a one shot contract the client has only the elements (wt, αt, Lt) with which to provide incentives.
Absent some sort of penalty for misreporting hours, any wt > 0 would lead the law firm to choose
ht = 0 and rt = ∞. Accordingly, we assume that a function r¯t(ht) exists such that: if rt > r¯t(ht),
11We allow the elements of the short term contract to depend on the type of case, because it makes the analysis
of the short term contract simpler. This seems a costless simplification, because it leads to a stronger benchmark
against which our long term contract must compete.
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then the law firm will be investigated, discovered lying, and suffer a prohibitively large net loss. If
rt ≤ r¯t(h) the law firm is not investigated. The function r¯t(h) is stochastic and determined by the
random variables λt and ρt. In particular, we assume that if it = i, then r¯t(h) = ψ(h−(h
∗
i+ρt))+λt.
Here ψ(·) is a positive single peaked function which achieves its unique maximum at zero. In
addition, limx→−∞ ψ(x) = limx→∞ ψ(x) = 0. A law firm maximizing the amount by which the
client is defrauded would choose ht = h
∗
i + ρt and rt = ht + ψ(0) + λt. Notice that λt > 0 lowers a
defrauded client’s surplus by transferring some of it to the law firm, while ρt 6= 0 lowers a defrauded
client’s surplus through a decrease in efficiency. We assume that λt is i.i.d. distributed on [0,Λ]
and ρt is i.i.d. distributed on [−Υ,Υ]. Both λt and ρt are distributed with full support. Let
Γ = Λ + ψ(0) denote the largest possible misrepresentation of hours by the law firm.
We don’t find the optimal short term contract, but rather demonstrate that it must involve a
loss in efficiency and positive profits for the law firm. Given some one shot contract, the firm acts
to maximize his expected payoff
max
r,h
αt · Aˆ(it, h) + wt · r − c · h+ Lt (1)
subject to r ≤ r¯t(h) (2)
Either wt = 0 in which case r has no payoff implications, or wt > 0 in which case the law firm’s
objective is strictly increasing in r. Hence, we substitute r = r¯t(h) into the objective function.
This leads to the following first order condition.
αtAh + wtr¯h = c (3)
We begin our analysis of Equation 3 with some simple observations. Because Lt has no impact
on incentives, the client always sets Lt = 0. In addition, the client always sets wt ≤ c, because if
wt > c then the law firm sets ht = ∞. We run through some simple cases to give a feel for the
contracting environment. Throughout, we set it = i.
We consider first the case in which αt = 0. In this case, if wt = c, then the law firm sets
ht = h
∗
i + ρt with E(ht) = h
∗
i . On the other hand, if wt < c then the law firm sets ht < h
∗
i + ρt. If
the difference c− wt is sufficiently large, then ht is driven to zero. Even in this simplest case with
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αt = 0, it is not clear that E(ht) = h
∗
i is desirable. Depending on the curvature of Aˆ(it, h) it is
quite possible that the expected value of the case is maximized with E(ht) < h
∗
i . In addition, the
client’s desire to minimize the law firm’s profits will also tend to put a downward pressure on wt
which leads to a downward pressure on ht.
If, on the other hand, wt = 0, then the first order condition becomes αtAˆh = c. In this case,
the law firm’s choice of ht is independent of ρt which makes it non-stochastic from the client’s
perspective. However, the client faces a tradeoff in setting αt. The closer αt is to zero, the further
the law firm’s choice will deviate below h∗i . On the other hand, the larger is αt, the larger are the
law firm’s profits. Clearly then the optimal value for αt lies somewhere between
c
Aˆh(i,0)
and 1. In
this range the law firm chooses ht < h
∗
i and makes strictly positive expected profit.
The client can certainly do no worse if she has the ability to set both αt > 0 and wt > 0. Clearly,
increasing αt and decreasing wt decreases both the dependence of the firm’s choice on ρt and the
cost associated with the law firm’s over reporting of hours. For αt close to zero, this might both
increase efficiency and decrease the law firm’s profits. However, as αt approaches 1 the increase
in efficiency must come with an increase in law firm profits. Consequently, αt < 1 in the optimal
short term contract. Let h(ρt) denote the dependence of the firm’s optimal choice of ht on ρt. The
expected value of the case under the one shot contract is
∫ Υ
−Υ
[Aˆ(it, h(ρt))− c · h(ρt)]g(ρt)dρt (4)
If wt = 0, then h(ρt) < h
∗
i , while if wt > 0, h(ρt) is not constant. In either case this integral is less
than Aˆ(it, h
∗
i )− ch
∗
i .
Our adherence to the institutional constraints on legal service compensation rules out some
possible first best one shot contracts. For example, simply removing the limited liability assumption
allows a first best contract. In particular, the client could sell the case to the law firm by setting
αt = 1, and setting Lt to the negative of the value of the case. Such a contract is illegal.
12
Let Xi denote the difference between Aˆ(i, h
∗
i ) − c · h
∗
i and the client’s expected payoff in the
best one shot contract for cases of type i. Let X¯ = mini{Xi} denote the minimum (across types of
cases) deviation from the first best payoff. Recall that Γ is the maximal amount by which a firm
12See Santore and Viard (2001) for a discussion of the relevant restrictions on legal service contracting.
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might misrepresent hours worked. To compare Γ to X¯ , we must put Γ in dollar terms, which we
do by multiplying by the marginal cost. Consider first the limit as Υ→ 0. The optimal short term
contract can be no worse than setting αt = 0 and wt = c, in which case h(ρt) → h
∗
i . Hence, as
Υ → 0 we have X¯ ≤ c · [ψ(0) + E(λt)] < c · Γ. On the other hand, if ψ(0) is small and Υ is large,
then in the limit as Λ → 0 we have X¯ > c · Γ = c · ψ(0). Clearly then X¯ may be greater than or
less than c · Γ.
4 The Repeated Interactions Contract
In this Section, we construct a contract that provides the law firm with the incentives to maximize
the joint value of each case. We focus on the law firm’s incentives because our criteria for the
contract is that it is efficient and looks like a wage contract, not that it is second best from the
client’s perspective. Let δ denote the discount rate. We make the following Assumption regarding
the noise term ξ(i, θ).
Assumption 1 For each i,
(1) ξθ,θ(i, θ) ≥ 0 (≤ 0) if θ > 0 (θ < 0,)
(2) ξ(i,−θ) = −ξ(i, θ) and
(3) Aθ(i, h
∗
i , 0) = B(i, h
∗
i ) · ξθ(i, 0) < δX¯.
Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 are equivalent to assuming that the distribution on A(i, h, θ) is uni-modal
and symmetric.13 Assumption 1.3 requires that values of θ such that Ah(i, h
∗
i , θ) ≈ c are sufficiently
likely.14 To emphasize the repeated nature of the interactions, we assume that δ is close to one.
Hence, Assumption 1.3 has bite if and only if the one shot contracts are close to being first best
and X¯ is small.
The Probability of Retention Function, P , is a central feature of our contract. This function
states the probability with which the client continues his relationship with the law firm past the
current case. The probability of retention is (weakly) increasing in the client’s payoff from the
current case. Recall that the law firm cannot defraud the client by more than w ·Γ without getting
caught.
13As shown in the Appendix.
14In other words, this is an assumption that the implied density function for ξ is sufficiently large at ξ = 0.
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Theorem 1 Let Assumptions 1 hold. If Γ is sufficiently small, then one may construct a long
term contract such that:
(1) when it = i the law firm accepts the case and sets h = h
∗
i and r = r
∗
i , and
(2) the client receives an expected payoff from the current case larger than the expected payoff from
any one shot contract.
In one such contract: L > 0, α = 0, w = c, and P is piecewise linear and weakly increasing in
A(i, h, θ) − w · r.
Conclusion (1) of Theorem 1 is that the law firm chooses the efficient number of hours, and reports
this truthfully. It is worth noting that the only contingent element in the described contract is the
retention probability function P . Hence, the efficient and truthful behavior predicted by Theorem
1 follows entirely from the law firm’s efforts to maintain the relationship. The magnitude of Γ is
important because the contract for which we solve makes r = h = h∗i a local maximum for the law
firm. Defrauding the client by maximizing w · r¯t(h)− c · h is a non-local alternative which creates
an incentive compatibility constraint. 15 The larger is Γ, the harder it is to satisfy that constraint.
Conclusion (2) stops short of asserting that our proposed contract is either first or second best from
the client’s perspective.
The contract satisfying statements (1) and (2) from Theorem 1 is not unique. To begin, even
if the other elements of the contract were fixed, there would be a range of feasible values for L.
However, since the market is competitive, the selected contract should have the lowest feasible
value for L. In addition, there may be feasible contracts with α > 0 and w < c. These issues are
discussed further below.
There are broadly speaking two steps in the proof of Theorem 1. We first construct a contract
with the desired properties for a fixed value of i. Because this construction illuminates how our
contract functions, we provide an outline in the body below. Standard fixed point arguments
demonstrate that one may do this simultaneously for each value of i.
15The issue here is that in defrauding the client, the law firm might push P (·) to zero. At this point, the client has
nothing to loose by defrauding the client as much as possible.
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We use a tilde to indicate that expectations have been taken over both θ and i. For example,
P˜ = Ei[Eθ[P ]]. The firm’s Bellman equation is
Vˆ (i) = max
h,r
{
L+ αAˆ− c · h+ w · r + δPˆ V˜
}
(5)
We assume that all actions at times t+ 1 and later are optimal, for, from the one-shot deviations
principle, it is sufficient to show, as we do below, the law firm does not wish to deviate from the
equilibrium strategy in the current period.
We construct the Probability of Retention Function, P , as follows
τ(i, h, r, θ) =
A(i, h, θ) − c · r − bi
∆i
(6)
P (i, h, r, θ) = max {0,min {1, τ(i, h, r, θ)}} (7)
The parameters ∆i and bi are chosen by the client. Whatever values are chosen for ∆i and bi,
τ is a linear and increasing function in the realized (and reported) joint return from the case,
A(i, h, θ) − c · r. The transformation from τ to P assures that 0 ≤ P ≤ 1.
The law firm’s Bellman Equation 5 contains the expectation of P . To find this expectation, we
define the following.
θi(h, r, bi) = min{θ|A(i, h, θ) ≥ c · r + bi} (8)
θi(h, r, bi,∆i) = max{θ|A(i, h, θ) ≤ ∆i + c · r + bi} (9)
θi is the minimum value of θi needed to ensure τ ≥ 0. θi is the maximum value of θi such that
τ ≤ 1. Figure 2 illustrates two possible relationships between τ , P , and θ. All i subscripts are
suppressed.
The diagram to the left is for a case in which τ(h, r, i,−1/2) < 0 and τ(h, r, i, 1/2) > 1, while
the picture to the right is a case in which τ(h, r, i,−1/2) = 0 and τ(h, r, i, 1/2) ≤ 1. These are the
equilibrium cases for τ and P . With this notation we have
Pˆ (i, h, r) =
∫ θi
−1/2
0dθ +
∫ θi
θi
τdθ +
∫ 1/2
θi
1dθ (10)
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=
∫ θi
θi
τdθ + 1/2 − θi (11)
With the relationship between Pˆ , ∆i and bi spelled out, we are ready to state the following.
Proposition 1 Let Assumptions 1 hold. Set α = 0, and w = c. Fix a value i and then fix bj and
∆j for j 6= i. Further, assume that for j 6= i, the law firm must set hj = rj = h
∗
j . If Γ is not too
large, then there exist L, ∆i, and bi such that in any period t with it = i:
(1) the client prefers the long term contract to any one shot contract.
(2) The long term contract induces the law firm to set hours efficiently and report hours truthfully.
Obviously the assumption that hj = rj = h
∗
j for j 6= i renders Proposition 1 questionable as
anything other than an intermediate result.16 However, that is exactly what it is. The gap between
Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 is bridged by removing this questionable assumption. Instead, we look
for a contract which simultaneously leads the law firm to choose optimally and report truthfully
for each possible value of it.
Proposition 1 is achieved by manipulating the first order conditions for the firm’s Bellman
Equation 5. Lemma 1 simplifies the first order conditions.
Lemma 1 Let it = i. If A
∗
h,θ = 0, then a necessary condition for the firm to choose r = h = h
∗
i is
w = (1− α) · c.
16Proposition 1 may also be taken as the final result if I is a singleton.
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If the law firm cannot control volatility, then A∗h,θ = 0. Since we don’t rule out this possibility, we
need to respect the restriction that w = (1− α) · c.17 Clearly if there is no contingent fee (α = 0),
then the wage equals the firm’s opportunity cost, w = c. In this case, if the contract is written
so that the law firm reports hours honestly, r = h, then the law firm’s only incentive in setting
hours is through the impact those hours have on the probability of being retained. On the other
hand, if α > 0 and w = (1 − α)c, then the law firm’s profit (with r = h) on the current case
is L + α(A − c · h). Since L ≥ 0, due to limited liability, the larger is the contingent percentage
α, the harder it is to write a long term contract that the client prefers to a short term contract.
Henceforth we set α = 0 and w = c.
In the desired contract, the firm’s first order conditions must hold when h = r = h∗i . We define
θ∗i (bi) ≡ θi(h
∗
i , r
∗
i , bi) and θ
∗
i (bi,∆i) ≡ θi(h
∗
i , r
∗
i , bi,∆i). The first order condition for r = r
∗
i is
1 =
(
θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i
∆i
)(
δL
1− δP˜ ∗
)
. (12)
The second term on the RHS of Equation 12 is δV˜ . The first term on the RHS of Equation 12 is
1
c ·
∂Pˆi
∂r . So multiply both sides of Equation 12 by the wage rate w = c. The resulting LHS is w,
the marginal benefit of increasing r. The resulting RHS is the marginal cost of an increase in r, as
reflected by the decreased probability of receiving the future value δV˜ .
If Equation 12 holds, then the first order condition for h = h∗i is
1
(θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i )
∫ θ∗i
θ∗i
A∗hdθ = c. (13)
From Equation 12, the fraction preceding the integral on the LHS of Equation 13 equals δV˜∆ . The
integral itself is ∆ · ∂Pˆi∂h . Hence the LHS of Equation 13 is the marginal benefit of an increase in h,
as reflected in an increased probability of receiving the future benefit δV˜ . The RHS is the marginal
cost of h.
Clearly then, the client’s objective is to set ∆i and bi so that Equations 12 and 13 hold. By
the definition of h∗i , Equation 13 holds when θ
∗
i = −
1
2 and θ
∗
i =
1
2 . However, because θ
∗
i , θ
∗
i and
17The possibility that A∗h,θ = 0 is the easiest way to require w = (1− α) · c. However, there are other compelling
reasons. See, for example, footnote 18.
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P˜ ∗ are all determined by bi and ∆i, it is not immediately obvious that Equation 12 can be solved
when θ∗i = −
1
2 and θ
∗
i =
1
2 . In the Appendix, we show that we can solve 12 with θ
∗
i = −
1
2 and
θ
∗
i =
1
2 so long as L is sufficiently large.
18 On the other hand, the client prefers the long term
contract only if L is sufficiently small. It is here that Assumption 1.3 comes into play. Recall that
X¯ is the minimum loss in efficiency from a short term contract. In the Appendix, we show that,
under Assumption 1.3, there is a value of L < δX¯ for which we can solve Equations 12 and 13.
Any L < δX¯ will serve to satisfy the requirement that the client is better off than under a short
term contract.
To use Proposition 1 to prove Theorem 1, one must find {(bi,∆i)}i∈I that satisfy Equations 12
and 13 simultaneously for each i. We do this using standard fixed point arguments. In particular,
we first establish a relationship bi(∆i) such that if bi = bi(∆i), then Equation 13 holds for it = i.
This reduces the client’s task to choosing ∆i. We then define ∆
e
i as the solution (with bi = bi(∆i))
to Equation 12 given the values of {∆j}j 6=i. Finally, we show that ∆
e = (∆e1, ...∆
e
n) satisfies the
requirements for the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem. This fixed point, is then our desired contract
which simultaneously satisfies Equations 12 and 13 for each i.
A range of values for L satisfy the requirements for Theorem 1. However, we assume that the
market for law firms is competitive. Hence, L should take the smallest value which both: satisfies
the incentive compatibility constraint, and allows a simultaneous solution of Equations 12 and 13
for each value of i.
4.1 The Equilibrium Retention Probability
A cursory read of Appendix B reveals that the maximum possible equilibrium value for Pˆ is 1/2. We
now present a slightly more general retention function which allows the client to set the probability
of retention as close to one as desired.
Let us keep the definitions of τ and P , but suppose that the probability of retention is equal to
Q(i, h, r, θ) = z · P (i, h, r, θ) + (1− z)
18 If w 6= (1−α)c, then θ∗i 6= −θ
∗
i . Hence, one cannot set θ
∗
i = −
1
2
and θ
∗
i =
1
2
. In this case, it is not clear that we
can find a solution for ’large’ L. This might leave us without a solution.
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for some z ∈ (0, 1]. This leads to an expected probability of retention of
Qˆi = z · Pˆi + (1− z) = z
(∫ θi
θi
τdθ + 1/2− θi
)
+ (1− z).
Clearly, as z → 0 the probability of retention goes to 1. Let us keep to the restriction that w = c
and α = 0, and recall that for each i the simple retention function, Pi, is defined by bi and ∆i.
Proposition 2 Let Assumptions 1 hold. Let Q ∈ [1/2, 1) be a desired probability of retention. If
Γ is sufficiently small, and δ is sufficiently close to one, then one may design a contract using Q
as the retention function such that
(1) The results from Theorem 1 hold, and
(2) The equilibrium expected probability of retention is at the desired level; Q˜∗ = Q.
To put it simply, when agents are patient enough (or interact frequently enough,) one can set the
probability of retention as close to one as desired.
The key to the proof of Proposition 2 is the first order conditions Equations 12 and 13. Using
Q with z < 1 rather than P as the retention function does have effects on incentives. On the one
hand, decreasing z increases Q˜∗. This increases δV˜ , the value of having the relationship continue
onto the next period. This strengthens the law firm’s incentive to maintain the relationship. On
the other hand, because ∂Qˆ = z · ∂Pˆ , decreasing z decreases the impact that both h and r have on
Qˆ. This weakens the law firm’s incentives. In the limit as δ → 1, these two effects exactly cancel
out. In the Appendix we show that the firm’s first order conditions become independent of z in the
limit as δ → 1. In other words, whatever value of z is chosen, the first order conditions converge to
Equations 12 and 13. Since all results are based upon these two first order conditions, Proposition
2 follows.
5 Discussion
We have constructed an efficient contract in a repeated relationship between a corporate client and
a law firm consisting of three central elements: a wage rate equal to the law firm’s opportunity
cost, a lump sum payment, and a probability of retention function. Our results are in contrast to
the generally accepted result that (in a one shot setting) contingent fee contracts create the best
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incentives for attorneys. We make no claim that our contract is ’second best.’ Our claim is only to
have found a justification for the ubiquitous presence of wage contracts between corporate clients
and law firms.
Our ability to construct this contract follows from three things: the repeated nature of the
relationship, the ability of a client to costlessly change law firms, and the presence of a lump sum
payment. We take it as self evident that there are repeated relationships between corporate clients
and law firms. We now discuss the the cost of changing law firms and the lump sum payment.
It is not far off to suggest that the client can change law firms costlessly. In creating preferred
counsel lists, corporations establish contracts with many law firms. Thus, if the corporation wishes
to end its relationship with one law firm it is able to redistribute the caseload to other firms on
the list without the need for extensive negotiations or an expensive search for a new law firm. In
addition, given the high value that law firms place on ‘rainmakers,’ it seems likely that any search
cost associated with finding a new law firm will fall largely on the prospective law firms.
We suggest two possible interpretations of L. The simple interpretation is that Lmight represent
the interest payment on what is known as a ‘pure retainer.’ A pure retainer is a payment to the
law firm that is not related to any specific service but rather to ensure that the law firm will be
available to the client and that it will not represent any parties adverse to the client (see Calloway
and Robertson, 2002). The interpretation which appeared in the Introduction is that L appears
in the wage payment. In particular, L might represent an accepted difference between r and h. If
one were to replace r in τ (and hence P and Q) with r − L/w, then the law firm would have the
incentive to set r = h + L/w. The difference between r and h might arise because the law firm
charges every time for administrative costs that it only bears in the first interaction. On the other
hand, it may be that the law firm and client simply agree upon the difference between r and h.
In our model, the client reviews the performance of the firm following each case. One might
believe that it is more likely that the firm’s performance is reviewed over a longer period of time.
However, a recent survey of corporate general counsel found that corporate clients are willing to
change law firms the moment they feel that the firm is not putting forth enough effort (Jones,
2003). The general counsel for a Kansas City based corporation stated, ”As soon as I feel that one
of our national firms is taking us from granted, I’ll give one of our Kansas City firms a little more
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work [that otherwise would have gone to the larger firm], and then issue a press release letting
everyone know what I’ve done.” Thus, it appears that firm performance is continuously monitored.
Our results are robust to the status of the client. That is, they hold whether the client is the
plaintiff or defendant in the legal case. It does not matter if the expected reward from the case
is positive or negative. Our results also apply to settlements and other negotiations and financial
dealings that do not involve a trial but necessitate the use of lawyers. Our model is, therefore,
robust to the client’s position in the case and more general than contracts previously proposed.
Since we assume that the client is fully informed concerning the value of the case, frivolous
lawsuits are outside the scope of our model. However, it seems likely that if our model were
properly enlarged, then our suggested contract would discourage frivolous lawsuits. The law firm
will not agree to represent the client in any case that has no merit because it knows that the
outcome will be less than what the client expects. Representing the client in such a case would
reduce the likelihood that the client would hire the law firm in future cases.
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A Appendix
Before we proceed with the Proofs of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, we verify the claims regarding
Assumption 1. Let Fi(ξ) and fi(ξ) denote the CDF and density of the noise term ξ(i, θ). Clearly
Fi(ξ(i, θ)) = 1/2 + θ. Taking a derivative with respect to θ yields fi(ξ) · ξθ = 1 or
fi(ξ) =
1
ξθ
Now clearly ξ is symmetrically distributed around zero if and only if fi(ξ) = fi(−ξ), which (from
the above) holds if and only if ξθ(i,−θ) = ξθ(i, θ). Hence, ξ is symmetrically distributed if and only
if ξ(i,−θ) = −ξ(i, θ), which is Assumption 1.2.
Taking a derivative of fi(ξ) yields
dfi
dξ
=
−ξθθ
[ξθ]3
So Assumption 1.1 is the same as assuming that the density on ξ is weakly increasing for ξ < 0 and
weakly decreasing for ξ > 0. If there are no point masses, then this is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the distribution to be uni-modal.
The above Equations are not defined if ξθ = 0. If ξθ = 0 over some range θ ∈ [a, b], then
there is a point mass at ξ(i, a), and Fi takes a discrete jump at this point. However, notices that
Assumption 1.1 assures that ξθ ≥ 0 achieves its minimum at zero. Hence the only possible point
mass is at ξ(i, 0) = 0. Again, we have a uni-modal distribution.
B Proof of Proposition 1
LetQ = zP+(1−z) for z ∈ (0, 1]. ClearlyQ is a more general retention probability function. Rather
than proving Proposition 1, we prove a more general result. We use the following Assumption to
make the statement of the more general result easier.
Assumption 2 Γ is sufficiently small and one of the following holds:
(1) z = 1, or
(2) δ is sufficiently large.
Proposition 1 uses Assumption 2.1.
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Proposition 3 Let α = 0, w = c and Ri = h
∗
i . Fix z ∈ (0, 1]. Fix a value i and then fix bj and
∆j for j 6= i. Further, assume that for j 6= i, the law firm must set hj = rj = h
∗
j . If Assumptions
1 and 2 hold, then there exist L, ∆i, and bi such that in any period t with it = i:
(1) the client prefers the long term contract to any one shot contract.
(2) The long term contract induces the law firm to set hours efficiently and report hours truthfully.
The firm acts to maximize it’s discounted expected stream of profits. Hence, he acts to satisfy first
order conditions of his Bellman Equation
Vˆ (i) = max
h,r
{
L+ αAˆ− c · h+w · r + δQˆV˜
}
(14)
The firm’s first order condition with respect to h is
dQˆ
dh
=
c− αAˆh
δV˜
(15)
while the first order condition with respect to r is
dQˆ
dr
=
−w
δV˜
(16)
Our next step is to replace the derivatives of Qˆ in Equations 15 and 16 with more explicit expres-
sions. We recall that the expectation of P is
Pˆ (i, h, r) =
∫ θi
θi
τdθ + 1/2 − θi [Equation 11]
Taking a derivative of Equation 11 with respect to h yields
dPˆ
dh
= τ(θi)
dθi
dh
− τ(θi)
dθi
dh
+
∫ θi
θi
dτ
dh
dθ −
dθi
dh
= −τ(θi)
dθi
dh
+ [τ(θi)− 1]
dθi
dh
+
∫ θi
θi
dτ
dh
dθ
=
∫ θi
θi
dτ
dh
dθ.
The final equality follows from the relationship between τ and θi and θi. In particular, if τ(θi) < 1,
then θi = 1/2 and
dθi
dh = 0. Likewise, if τ(θi) > 0, then θi = −1/2 and
dθi
dh = 0. Since
dQˆ
dh =
dQˆ
dPˆ
· dPˆdh
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and τ(i, h, r, θ) = A−c·r−bi∆i we have
dQˆ
dh
= z
∫ θi
θi
Ah
∆i
dθ (17)
Combining Equations 15 and 17 yields Equation 18.
c− αAˆh
δV˜
= z
∫ θi
θi
Ah
∆i
dθ (18)
By arguments analogous to those used in the derivation of Equation 17, the derivative of Qˆ with
respect to r is
dQˆ
dr
= z
∫ θi
θi
−c
∆i
dθ =
−c(θi − θi)z
∆i
(19)
Combining Equations 16 and 19 yields Equation 20 below.
∆i
z
=
(
c
w
)
(θi − θi)δV˜ (20)
Equations 18 and 20 both include V˜ which is endogenous. This motivates us to divide Equation
18 by Equation 20 to remove common terms including V˜ . Doing this yields Equation 21.
∫ θi
θi
Ahdθ =
(
c
w
)
(c− αAˆh) ·
(
θi − θi
)
(21)
Equation 21 is a necessary condition for both first order conditions to hold.
Proof of Lemma 1:
By definition Aˆ∗h = c. If A
∗
h,θ = 0, then A
∗
h is constant in θ. That is to say A
∗
h = Aˆ
∗
h = c within the
integral in Equation 21. This reduces Equation 21 to w = (1− α)c.♣
As in the body, we set α = 0 and w = c henceforth. Doing this, and requiring that Equation 21
holds when h = r = h∗i yields the first order condition for h presented in the body
1
(θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i )
∫ θ∗i
θ∗i
A∗hdθ = c. [Equation 13]
If α = 0, w = c, and Equation 21 holds, then Equations 18 and 20 both reduce to
∆i
z
= (θi − θi)δV˜ (22)
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We convert Equation 22 into Equation 24 by replacing V˜ with an endogenously determined value.
If α = 0, w = c, and the first order conditions hold so that h = r = h∗i , then the firm’s Bellman
Equation 5 becomes
Vˆ (i) = L+ δQˆ∗i V˜
Taking expectations over i, and recalling that, e.g., Q˜∗ = Ei(Qˆ
∗
i ), we have
V˜ =
L
1− δQ˜∗
(23)
Plugging Equation 23 into Equation 22 and setting r = h = h∗i yields
1 =
(
θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i
∆i
)(
zδL
1− δQ˜∗
)
(24)
Setting z = 1 makes Q˜∗ = P˜ ∗, and turns Equation 24 into Equation 12.
We now argue that it is possible to solve Equations 24 and 13 simultaneously. The first step to
this is to show that we have some freedom in choosing pairs (bi,∆i) to solve Equation 13. There
are two simple cases which we dispense with first. If A∗h,θ = B
∗
h · ξθ = 0, then Equation 13 holds
automatically. Likewise, if bi and ∆i are such that −1/2 = θ
∗
i and θ
∗
i = 1/2, then Equation 13
holds by the definition of h∗i .
Equations 8 and 9 imply that if −1/2 = θ∗i and θ
∗
i = 1/2, then ∆i ≥ A(i, h
∗
i , θ
∗
i ) −A(i, h
∗
i , θ
∗
i ),
while if −1/2 < θ∗i < θ
∗
i < 1/2, then
∆i = A(i, h
∗
i , θ
∗
i )−A(i, h
∗
i , θ
∗
i ). (25)
Lemma B.1 Set α = 0 and w = c. Let Assumption 1 hold, fix i and assume that Bh(i, h
∗
i ) 6= 0. If
0 < ∆i ≤ A(i, h
∗
i , 1/2) − A(i, h
∗
i ,−1/2), then ∃!bi(∆i) with bi + c · h
∗
i ∈ [A(i, h
∗
i ,−1/2), A(i, h
∗
i , 0))
such that Equations 13 and 25 hold for θ∗i (bi) and θ
∗
i (bi,∆i).
Furthermore, bi(∆i) is strictly decreasing in ∆i, and θ
∗
i (bi) = −θ
∗
i (bi,∆i).
Before we prove Lemma B.1, there are some preliminaries to attend. We consider the comparative
statics from changing bi and ∆i. Let A
∗ = A(i, h∗i , θ
∗
i ) and A
∗
= A(i, h∗i , θ
∗
i ). Since it is the case
for Lemma B.1, assume that B∗h 6= 0 and −1/2 < θ
∗
i < θ
∗
i < 1/2. In this case θ
∗
i is defined by
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A∗ − ch∗i − bi = 0. It follows that
dθ∗i
dbi
=
1
A∗θ
> 0
Given θ∗i , we determine θ
∗
i by
∫ θ∗i
θ∗i
Ahdθ = c(θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i ). It follows that
dθ
∗
i
dθ∗i
=
A∗h − c
A
∗
h − c
< 0
Using the functional form A = Aˆ+B · ξ and Assumption 1, we have
dθ
∗
i
dθ∗i
=
Aˆ∗h −B
∗
h · ξ(θ
∗
i )− c
Aˆ∗h −B
∗
h · ξ(θ
∗
i )− c
=
ξ(θ∗i )
ξ(θ
∗
i )
= −1 (26)
The final equality derives from the following. We know that when θ∗i = −
1
2 , then θ
∗
i =
1
2 = −θ
∗
i . By
Assumption 1.2, the final equality must then hold at θ∗i = −
1
2 . Furthermore, as long as θ
∗
i = −θ
∗
i ,
the equality will hold, and as long as the equality holds along the path from −12 to θ
∗
i , then θ
∗
i = −θ
∗
i .
Hence, Equation 26 holds, as does the following Lemma.
Lemma B.2 If α = 0, w = c and Assumption 1 holds, then θ
∗
i = −θ
∗
i .
Given the negative symmetry of ξ it follows that ξθ(−θ) = ξθ(θ) so that A
∗
θ = A
∗
θ. Using the above
results, we have that
dθ
∗
i
dbi
=
dθ
∗
i
dθ∗i
·
dθ∗i
dbi
=
−1
A∗θ
< 0
Finally, ∆i = A
∗
−A∗, which leads us to
d∆i
dθ∗i
= A
∗
θ ·
dθ
∗
i
dθ∗i
−A∗θ = −2A
∗
θ
and
d∆i
dbi
=
d∆i
dθ∗i
·
dθ∗i
dbi
= −2
Proof of Lemma B.1: Given the above, we can define bi(∆i) = Aˆ
∗
i − ch
∗
i −
1
2∆i for 0 < ∆i ≤
A(i, h∗i ,
1
2 ) − A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2 ). It remains only to verify uniqueness. To this end we first consider if,
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given θ∗i it is possible to choose θ
∗
i 6= −θ
∗
i . Equation 13 can be written as
∫ θ∗i
θ∗i
A∗hdθ − c(θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i ) = 0.
Now if B∗h > 0 (resp. < 0) then we know that A
∗
h < c (resp. > c) if and only if θ < 0.
Hence, θ∗i < 0 < θ
∗
i . The derivative of the LHS of the above equation w.r.t. θ
∗
i is A
∗
h − c =
Aˆ∗h + B
∗
h · ξ(θ
∗
i )− c = B
∗
h · ξ(θ
∗
i ) which does not change sign for θ
∗
i > 0. Hence as one moves away
from θ
∗
i = −θ
∗
i the difference between the LHS and 0 only gets larger. This verifies that θ
∗
i = −θ
∗
i
is the only possibility. Now ∆i = A(i, h
∗
i , θ
∗
i )−A(i, h
∗
i , θ
∗
i ) = A(i, h
∗
i ,−θ
∗
i )−A(i, h
∗
i , θ
∗
i ). The RHS
is monotonically decreasing in θ∗i . Hence there is a unique value of θ
∗
i for a given ∆i. It is trivial
from the definition of θ∗i that there is a unique bi for each value of θ
∗
i which establishes uniqueness.
♣
Lemma B.1 establishes the relationship bi(∆i) for 0 < ∆i ≤ A(i, h
∗
i ,
1
2)−A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2 ) andB
∗
h 6= 0.
It is convenient to have bi(∆i) defined in all cases. To that end, if ∆i > A(i, h
∗
i , 1/2)−A(i, h
∗
i ,−1/2),
then we set bi(∆i) = A(i, h
∗
i ,−1/2) − c · h
∗
i . Finally, if 0 < ∆i ≤ A(i, h
∗
i ,
1
2 ) − A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2) and
B∗h = 0, then we set bi(∆i) so that θ
∗
i (bi) = −θ
∗
i (bi,∆i).
So long as bi = bi(∆i), then we know that (bi,∆i) solves Equation 13. Now in trying to choose
∆i to satisfy Equation 24, we see that both (θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i ) and Q˜
∗ = z ·
∑
j qj · P
∗
j + (1 − z) depends
upon ∆i. However, this dependence is well behaved.
Lemma B.3 If α = 0, w = c, and Assumption 1 holds, then ∆i
θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i
is weakly increasing in ∆i and
unbounded above.
Proof: Let y = ∆i
θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i
. If ∆i > A(i, h
∗
i ,
1
2) − A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2 ), then y = ∆i. This establishes both that
the derivative is positive in this range and that the function is unbounded above. Now consider
∆i < A(i, h
∗
i ,
1
2 ) − A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2). Let x = (θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i )
2 · dyd∆i . Clearly x and
dy
d∆i
have the same sign.
x = (θ
∗
i −θ
∗
i )−∆i
(
dθ
∗
i
d∆i
−
dθ∗i
d∆i
)
= (θ
∗
i −θ
∗
i )−∆i
(
dθ
∗
i
dbi
−
dθ∗i
dbi
)
· dbid∆i = (θ
∗
i −θ
∗
i )−
∆i
A∗
θ
. We observe that
∆i
θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i
≤ A∗θ because the first term is the average slope which by Assumption 1.1 is weakly less than
the slope at the edge, A∗θ. Hence x > 0. Finally, there is a kink at ∆i = A(i, h
∗
i ,
1
2 )−A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2).
However, at a kink a function is inarguably increasing if both its left and right hand derivatives are
positive.♣
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Lemma B.4 Let α = 0, w = c, and bi = bi(∆i) as defined above. If Assumption 1 holds, then
Pˆ ∗i =
1
2 for ∆i ≤ A(i, h
∗
i ,
1
2 )−A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2) and is decreasing in ∆i for ∆i > A(i, h
∗
i ,
1
2)−A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2 ).
Proof: We first consider the case in which ∆i ≤ A(i, h
∗
i ,
1
2 ) − A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2). In this case bi =
A∗(i, θ∗i )− c · h
∗
i so that
A∗ − c · h∗i − bi = A
∗ −A∗ = [Aˆ∗ +B∗ · ξ(θ)]− [Aˆ∗ +B∗ · ξ(θ∗i )] = B
∗[ξ(θ)− ξ(θ∗i )]
Also
∆i = A
∗
−A∗ = [Aˆ∗ +B∗ · ξ(i, θ
∗
i )]− [Aˆ
∗ +B∗ · ξ(i, θ∗i )] = B
∗[ξ(i, θ
∗
i )− ξ(i, θ
∗
i )] = 2B
∗ · ξ(θ
∗
i )
Hence we have that
Pˆ ∗i =
∫ θ∗i
θ∗i
B∗[ξ(θ)− ξ(θ∗i )]
2B∗ · ξ(θ
∗
i )
dθ + (
1
2
− θ
∗
i ) =
∫ θ∗i
θ∗i
ξ(θ)
2 · ξ(θ
∗
i )
dθ +
∫ θ∗i
θ∗i
ξ(θ
∗
i )
2 · ξ(θ
∗
i )
dθ + (
1
2
− θ
∗
i )
= 0 +
1
2
(θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i ) +
1
2
− θ
∗
i =
1
2
On the other hand, if ∆i > A(i, h
∗
i ,
1
2) − A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2) then bi = A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2) − c · h
∗
i , θ
∗
i = −
1
2 and
θ
∗
i =
1
2 . That is, none of these parameters depend upon ∆i. Hence
dPˆ ∗i
d∆i
= −
(
1
∆i
)2 ∫ 1
2
− 1
2
(A∗ − c · h∗i − bi)dθ < 0
♣
Lemma B.5 Let Assumption 1 hold, and set α = 0, w = c and bi = bi(∆i) as defined above.
In this case ∆i(1−δQ˜
∗)
θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i
is weakly increasing in ∆i and unbounded above.
Proof: We note that if j 6= i, then P ∗j does not depend upon ∆i, hence by Lemma B.4 Q˜
∗ =
z
∑
j P
∗
j +(1−z) is weakly decreasing in ∆i. The result then follows from an application of Lemma
B.3. ♣
With Lemma B.5 in hand, there are no difficulties if δL is large enough. In particular, if δL
is large enough that the LHS of Equation 24 is larger than the RHS when ∆i = A(i, h
∗
i , 1/2) −
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A(i, h∗i ,−1/2), then we can simply keep increasing ∆i until Equation 24 holds. We now address
the case in which ∆i < A(i, h
∗
i , 1/2) −A(i, h
∗
i ,−1/2).
Lemma B.6 Let bi = bi(∆i) as defined above. lim∆i→0
∆i
θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i
= Aθ(i, h
∗
i , 0).
Proof: lim∆i→0
∆i
θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i
= lim∆i→0
A(i,h∗
i
,θ
∗
i )−A(i,h
∗
i
,θ∗i )
θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i
= Aθ(i, h
∗
i , 0). The first equality follows from
Equation 25 which holds for ∆i sufficiently small. The second equality is just the definition of a
derivative. ♣
We rewrite Equation 24 as
zδL =
(
∆i
θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i
)(
1− δQ˜∗
)
(27)
We use 1− δQ˜∗ = 1− δ(1− z)− zδP˜ ∗ and P˜ ∗ = qi · Pˆ
∗
i +
∑
j 6=i qj · Pˆ
∗
j to transform Equation 27 into
zδL =
(
∆i
θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i
)
1− δ(1 − z)− zδ

∑
j 6=i
qj · Pˆ
∗
j

− zδ · qi · Pˆ ∗i

 (28)
Let Ki = 1− δ(1− z)− δz
(∑
j 6=i qjPˆ
∗
j
)
− qizδ2 . We note that Ki ∈ (0, 1) and is constant in ∆i and
bi. We use Equation 11 to transform Equation 28 to
zδL =
(
∆i
θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i
)(
Ki + zδ · qi · θ
∗
i − δz · qi
∫ θ∗i
θ∗i
(
A∗ − c · h∗ − b
∆i
)
dθ
)
(29)
We break Equation 29 into two pieces, divide by z, and factor ∆i
θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i
out of the second piece to
arrive at
δL =
(
∆i
θ
∗
− θ∗
)(
Ki + δzqiθ
∗
i
z
)
− δqi
∫ θ∗
θ∗
A ∗ −ch∗ − bi
θ
∗
− θ∗
dθ (30)
Recall that X¯ is the minimum (over i) efficiency loss from a one shot contract. We notice that
lim∆i→0 bi(∆i) = βi ≡ A(i, h
∗
i , 0)− c · h
∗
i . We have that
lim
∆i→0
(
∆i
θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i
)(
Ki + δzqiθ
∗
i
z
)
= Aθ(i, h
∗
i , 0)
(
Ki + δzqi/2
z
)
< δX¯
(
Ki + δzqi/2
z
)
(31)
lim
∆i→0
∫ θ∗i
θ∗i
(
A∗ − c · h∗i − bi
θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i
)
dθ = A(i, h∗i , 0)− c · h
∗
i − βi = 0 (32)
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We must now consider which part of Assumption 2 holds. If z = 1, then we have
Ki + δzqi/2
z
= 1− δ

∑
j 6=i
qj · Pˆ
∗
j

 < 1.
Consequently, the limit as ∆i → 0 of the RHS of Equation 30 is less than δX¯(Ki + δqiθ
∗
i ) < δX¯ .
Hence, ∃ǫ > 0 such that if L = X¯ − ǫ, then the contract is feasible and the client strictly prefers
the current expected payoff from this contract to any one shot contract.
We next turn to the case in which δ is sufficiently close to one. We can see that
lim
δ→1
Ki + δzqi/2
z
= limδ→1
1− δ(1 − z)− δz
(∑
j 6=i qjPˆ
∗
j
)
z
=
z − z
(∑
j 6=i qjPˆ
∗
j
)
z
= 1−
∑
j 6=i
qjPˆ
∗
j < 1
Hence for δ sufficiently close to 1, it is again the case that the limit as ∆i → 0 of the RHS of
Equation 30 is less than δX¯ .
It remains only to establish that the firm cannot make itself better off by attempting to defraud
the client. The choice of r = h = h∗i is locally optimal. However, choosing h and r so as to defraud
the client is a non-local alternative. Being a non-local alternative, it must lead to a discrete drop
in the probability of being retained. Since being retained has a strictly positive value, this leads to
discrete drop in the expected present value of future payoffs. For Γ sufficiently small, this lowers
the payoff to the law firm. This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
C Proof of Theorem 1 and Proposition 2
We note that the difference between these results is that in Theorem 1 Assumption 2.1 holds, while
in Proposition 2 Assumption 2.2 hold.
We proceed with ∆i determining bi, θ
∗
i , and θ
∗
i . This assures that Equation 13 holds for
each i. It remains to show that we can also simultaneously satisfy Equation 24 for each i. Let
ρi(∆1, ...∆n) =
(
∆i
θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i
)(
1− δQ˜∗
)
. Equation 24 can be written as zδL = ρi. Let ∆
e
i denote the
solution to Equation 24 given ∆ = (∆1...∆n).
Lemma C.1 Let α = 0, w = c, and bi = bi(∆i) as defined above. ∆
e
i is continuous in and weakly
decreasing in ∆j.
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Proof: We notice that ∆ei acts to set zδL = ρi. The function ρi is: continuous in both ∆i and
∆j, strictly monotonically increasing in ∆i, and weakly monotonically increasing in ∆j. Hence an
infinitesimal increase in ∆j must be met by no more than an infinitesimal decrease in ∆
e
i .♣
Let ∆e ≡ (∆e1, ...∆
e
n). The Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem states that there is a fixed point
if ∆e is a continuous function on a compact and convex domain. Lemma C.1 states that ∆e is
continuous. However, the domain of ∆ is ℜn++ which is not compact. We now demonstrate that
there is a compact and convex sub-domain of ℜn++ which ∆
e maps into itself. This will suffice,
since there must be a fixed point on this sub-domain.
We use monotonicity to establish an upper bound for ∆ei which we denote as ∆¯i. Let us assume
for the moment that ∆¯i > A(i, h
∗
i ,
1
2 )−A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2). In this case θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i = 1, and
∆ei =
zδL
(1− δQ˜∗)
≤
δL
(1− δ)
Hence ∆ei ≤ ∆¯i ≡ max{
δL
(1−δ) , A(i, h
∗
i ,
1
2 )−A(i, h
∗
i ,−
1
2 ), }.
We now establish a lower bound for ∆ei which we denote as ∆i. Clearly 0 is a lower bound for
∆ei . However, neither τ nor Q are defined for ∆i = 0. Hence, what we need is to establish a lower
bound ∆i > 0. We work with ∆j ≤ ∆¯j in which case we have
∆ei
θ
∗
i − θ
∗
i
=
zδL
1− Q˜∗
> zδL (33)
The strict inequality follows since Qˆ∗j = 0 only if ∆j = ∞ and z = 1. We know from Lemmas
B.3 and B.6 that we may set the LHS of Equation 33 to any value strictly greater than Aθ(i, h
∗
i , 0)
which itself is strictly less than δX¯ . Hence if z = 1, then we can fix ǫ with 0 < ǫ < X −
Aθ(i,h
∗
i
,0)
δ .
Set L = X¯ − ǫ. Now since δL > Aθ(i, h
∗
i , 0) and
∆i
θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i
is increasing, it follows that there exists a
∆i > 0 such that
∆i
θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i
= δL. From Equation 33 it follows that ∆ei > ∆i as long as ∆j ≤ ∆¯j.
Now on the other hand, suppose that z < 1. In this case we note that
lim
δ→1
zδL
1− Q˜∗
= lim
δ→1
zδL
1− δ(1− z)− P˜ ∗
=
L
1− P˜ ∗
> L
Hence, for δ sufficiently close to one, we can for identical reasons find a ∆i > 0 such that
∆i
θ
∗
i−θ
∗
i
= δL.
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Again, from Equation 33 it follows that ∆ei > ∆i as long as ∆j ≤ ∆¯j .
With this lower bound established, we may apply the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem. A fixed
point to ∆e is a simultaneous solution to Equation 24 for each value of i. Hence, the firm voluntarily
sets hj = rj = h
∗
j for each value of j. This renders moot the fact that ∆
e was defined as the solution
for Equation 24 with hj = rj = h
∗
j for j 6= i. That is, define ∆¯
e as we defined ∆e, but with the
requirement that each hj and rj are chosen to maximize the discounted present value of payments
to the firm. The fixed point to ∆e must also be a fixed point for ∆¯e. Hence, at this fixed point the
law firm is choosing hi = ri = h
∗
i for each value of i absent any assumptions concerning how other
hj and rj are chosen. Finally, we note that L was set less than X¯. Hence, the client prefers the
long term contract for each value of i.
As in the proof of Proposition3, the law firm has no desire to defraud the client. This follows
for the exact same reasons. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
To complete the proof of Proposition 2 we need to show that we can choose z to set Q˜∗ to any
value in [1/2, 1). We first note that Q˜∗ = P˜ ∗ ≤ 1/2 when z = 1 and Q˜∗ → 1 as z → 0. Hence,
it remains only to show that Q˜∗ is continuous. We note that an infinitesimal change in z creates
an infinitesimal change in the law firm’s incentives which can be rebalanced with an infinitesimal
change in L, and {∆i}i. Hence, if we think of L and {∆i}i as functions of z, then Q˜
∗ is continuous
in z. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
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